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Mind-reading is no longer a concept confined to the world of 
science-fiction: “Brain reading technologies are rapidly being 
developed in a number of neuroscience fields.”1 One obvious 
application is to the field of criminal justice: Mind-reading technology 
can potentially aid investigators in assessing critical legal questions 
such as guilt, legal insanity, and the risk of recidivism.2 Two current 
techniques have received the most scholarly attention for their 
potential in aiding interrogators in determining guilt: brain-based lie 
detection3 and brain-based memory detection.4 
Neurologically inspired brain-based lie detection is akin to a 
polygraph test, and primarily relies on functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (“fMRI”) to detect deception. “The appeal of this brain-based 
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lie detection approach is that, in contrast to most previous methods—
which detected the emotional arousal resulting from deception—it 
measures physiological changes associated with cognitive processes 
during deception and could therefore, in principle, be detecting the 
process of deception itself.”5 
In contrast, brain-based memory detection, or brain fingerprinting, 
involves analyzing brain waves to determine whether “a given stimulus 
is something that [the subjects] have encountered in their past, or 
whether [the stimulus] is being encountered for the first time.”6 The 
idea underlying this method is that our subconscious brains possess an 
uncontrollable and perceptible response to familiar stimuli that an 
electroencephalography (“EEG”) machine can register.7 
This growing ability to peer inside someone’s mind raises 
significant legal issues. A number of American scholars, especially in 
the past fifteen years, have debated the constitutionality of forensically 
employing mind-reading technologies on United States citizens.8 
Almost no scholarly attention, however, has focused on the legality of 
mind-reading technologies under international humanitarian law.9 This 
Note seeks to fill this gap in the literature and explores whether the 
administration of mind-reading technologies on a prisoner of war 
(“POW”) in an armed conflict violates international humanitarian 
 
 5.  Farah et al., supra note 3, at 123.  
 6.  Murphy & Rissman, supra note 4, at 4.  
 7.  Id. at 4–5.   
 8.  Some scholars have argued that mind-reading technologies may unconstitutionally 
infringe an individual’s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. See, e.g., Sarah E. 
Stoller & Paul Root Wolpe, Emerging Neurotechnologies for Lie Detection and the Fifth 
Amendment, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 359, 374 (2007) (“If, however, [the courts] focus on the 
communicative product and the violative nature of entering the suspect’s mind, they would likely 
find [neurotechnologies for lie detection] to fall within the Amendment’s bounds.”); Ronald J. 
Allen & Kristen Mace, The Self-Incrimination Clause Explained and its Future Predicted, 94 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 243, 248–50 (2004) (linking the connection between polygraph tests 
and Fifth Amendment violations to mind-reading technology). Others have argued that mind-
reading technologies do not violate the Fifth Amendment’s absolute prohibition against 
involuntary incrimination, but instead implicate the Fourth Amendment, which prohibits 
searches and seizures without probable cause. See Kiel Brennan-Marquez, A Modest Defense of 
Mind Reading, 15 YALE J.L. & TECH. 214, 258–60 (2012) (“The identification of private or sacred 
space, in other words, goes to the Fourth Amendment, not the Fifth . . . [t]he mind, like the home, 
is a place where seizures occur.”). 
 9.  Only one scholarly publication has analyzed the legality of the use of mind-reading 
technologies during the interrogation of foreign detainees. See Sean Kevin Thompson, Note, The 
Legality of the Use of Psychiatric Neuroimaging in Intelligence Interrogation, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 
1601 (2005) (arguing that the application of mind-reading technology on detainees violates the 
Geneva Conventions).  
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law.10 
The legality of using mind-reading technologies against an 
unwilling prisoner of war largely turns on the meaning of “coercion.” 
POWs are entitled to a myriad of protections under the Third Geneva 
Convention (“Geneva III”).11 One such protection is found in Article 
17, which specifically regulates the general interrogation of prisoners.12 
It provides that “[n]o physical or mental torture, nor any other form of 
coercion, may be inflicted on prisoners of war to secure from them 
information of any kind whatever.”13 Moreover, uncooperative POWs 
who refuse to answer questions “may not be threatened, insulted, or 
exposed to any unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of any 
 
 10.  While other provisions in international human rights law (hereinafter HRL) similarly 
limit interrogation methods, these provisions are inapplicable during international armed conflict 
and therefore do not warrant further discussion. See id. at 1618 (noting that international 
humanitarian law applies to detainees of the War on Terror who did not qualify for protection 
under the Geneva Conventions). The main reason that HRL does not apply is because the United 
States, as well as Israel, does not believe that HRL applies during international armed conflict, 
especially when an international humanitarian law provision already applies to the situation 
under consideration. GARY D. SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 26 (2d ed. 2016). 
Moreover, even if HRL did apply, it is doubtful that employing mind-reading technology would 
violate any HRL prohibition. See Thompson, supra note 9, at 1626 (arguing that reading a 
detainee’s mind does not violate the prohibition against cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment). 
 11.  Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 
U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva III]. Other provisions in Geneva III may also 
circumscribe the use of certain interrogation methods, but are not applicable to mind-reading 
technology and therefore will not be discussed any further. Article 13 of Geneva III, for example, 
states that all POWs must be “humanely treated.” Id. art. 13. Additionally, the detaining power 
has an obligation to protect all POWs, especially against “acts of violence or intimidation and 
against insults and public curiosity.” Id. Here, the use of mind-reading technology on POWs does 
not prima facie constitute inhumane treatment: fMRI, EEG, and other medical imaging 
technologies are routinely used on civilians for medical purposes and pose no health risks. See 
Functional MRI of the Brain, YALE MEDICINE, 
https://www.yalemedicine.org/conditions/functional-mri-imaging-the-brain (noting that “an 
fMRI is safe, painless, and noninvasive” and “there are no known health risks of the procedure.”); 
Electroencephalogram (EEG), NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICES, 
https://www.nhs.uk/conditions/electroencephalogram/ (noting that an EEG “is painless, 
comfortable and generally very safe. No electricity is put into your body while it’s carried out. 
Apart from having messy hair and possibly feeling a bit tired, you normally will not experience 
any side effects.”). Furthermore, the blanket ban on medical experiments only prohibits 
subjecting POWs to injurious treatment in the pursuit of scientific knowledge, but does not 
otherwise prohibit using medical equipment for non-experimental purposes, such as 
interrogation. See INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY OF 2020 
Art. 13 (2020), https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl/full/GCIII-commentary [hereinafter 2020 ICRC 
Commentary] (noting that Geneva III sought to prohibit medical experiments “with a view to 
preventing a recurrence of the cruel experiments which had been made in concentration camps 
during the last war.”). 
 12.  Geneva III, supra note 11, art. 17.  
 13.  Id. para. 4 (emphasis added).  
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kind.”14 Notably,  Article 17 does not prohibit interrogation, but merely 
limits the tactics available to elicit information.15 
Based upon current, prevailing interpretations of “coercion” in 
Article 17, mind-reading technology likely violates Geneva III. This 
Note, however, argues that an interpretation of coercion more faithful 
to the text and purpose of Article III would likely permit the 
application of mind-reading technology during interrogations. This 
Note will proceed in three parts. Part I briefly lays out the two 
prevailing interpretations of coercion, noting their implications for the 
legality of mind-reading technologies, and this Note’s interpretation of 
coercion, which markedly differs from the prevailing interpretations. 
Part II briefly expands upon the technology discussed in Part I—noting 
the potential for more accurate mind-reading technology in the future 
and the applicability of this technology to interrogations. Part III 
examines current interpretations of the term coercion, formulates a 
new definition by looking at the text and drafting history of Article 17, 
and contends that the coercion ban is meant to protect POWs from 
physical and mental suffering. Part IV then applies this new definition 
of coercion to various mind-reading technologies, concluding that the 
painless use of mind-reading technology does not violate Article 17 of 
Geneva III. 
I. INTERPRETATIONS OF COERCION 
This section will proceed by first briefly summarizing the prevailing 
interpretations of coercion. Subsection B then summarizes this Note’s 
interpretation of coercion, noting its implications for the legality of 
mind-reading. 
A. Current Interpretations of Coercion and Their Implications for the 
Legality of Mind-Reading Technologies 
Article 17 does not define the term coercion. Scholars have 
acknowledged that the lack of a clear definition of coercion makes it 
difficult to determine if any kind of physical discomfort or scientific 
method can be used during interrogation without the commission of an 
illegal act.16 Two approaches to defining coercion, however, are 
 
 14.  Id. 
 15.  Thompson, supra note 9, at 1613.  
 16.  See Stanley J. Glod & Lawrence J. Smith, Comments, Interrogation Under the 1949 
Prisoners of War Convention, 21 MIL. L. Rᴇᴠ. 145, 153–54 (1963) (“The problem is at what point 
physical discomforts cease to be minor and become illegal coercion. This presents a question of 
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discernible in the Article 17 literature. 
One approach, which can be called the ‘Free Will Approach,’17 
defines coercion as any situation in which information is secured 
against a detainee’s free will.18 Under this approach, brain-based lie 
detection is arguably not coercive, since the POW must voluntarily 
answer questions for the fMRI to detect deception.19 On the other 
hand, brain-based memory detection is coercive, since the machine 
extracts cognitive information even when the POW is not answering.20 
The second approach, which can be called the ‘Duty Approach,’21 
regards as coercion all harsh or intrusive methods designed to elicit any 
information whatsoever.22 According to this approach, the purpose 
behind the coercion ban is to uphold the POW’s “duty to refrain from 
giving military information to his captors.”23 Thus, under this Duty 
Approach, mind-reading technology is likely illegal as per Article 17. 
 
 
fact which must be determined separately in each case . . . . some minor physical discomforts . . . 
will not necessarily violate Article 17.”); William Ranney Levi, Note, Interrogation’s Law, 118 
YALE L.J. 1434, 1463 (2009) (noting that while the Geneva Conventions “provide boundaries for 
what might be considered permissible conduct in the interrogation of prisoners, definitional 
uncertainty remains with respect to central interrogation-relevant terms . . . the Conventions do 
not define coercion; they provide no articulable basis upon which to distinguish between lawful 
physical discomforts and illegal coercion.”). On a more general note, one scholar who has 
examined the general historical uses of the term coercion found that coercion has been used 
synonymously with several terms, such as “violence,” “compulsion,” “punishment,” “force,” 
“interference,” and the imposition of “one’s will on the will [of others].” Scott Anderson, 
Coercion, STAN. ENCYC. PHILOSOPHY, (Oct. 27, 2011), 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/coercion/. 
 17.  This term is self-coined. No proponents of the ‘Free Will Approach’ and no 
commentaries on the meaning of the term coercion, of which there are few, use this identifying 
label. 
 18.  Thompson, supra note 9, at 1618. See Dep’t of the Army, FM 2-22.3 (FM 34-52), Human 
Intelligence Collector Operations ¶ 5-26 (2006) [hereinafter FM 2-22.3] (stating that “[p]hysical 
or mental torture and coercion revolve around eliminating the source’s free will” and is “expressly 
prohibited by” Article 17).  
 19.  Thompson, supra note 9, at 1613.  
 20.  Id. at 1617–18.  
 21.  Similar to the ‘Free Will Approach,’ the ‘Duty Approach’ is self-coined.  
 22.  See, e.g., The Judge Advoc. Gen. of the U.S. Army, Use of “Truth Serum” in 
Questioning Prisoners of War, JAGW 1161/1157 (June 21, 1961), reprinted in INTERNATIONAL 
Lᴀᴡ STUDIES: DOCUMENTS ᴏɴ PRISONERS ᴏғ WAR 708–09 (Howard S. Levie ed., 1979) 
[hereinafter Use of “Truth Serum”]. Here, the Judge Advocate General of the Army stated that 
POWs must be protected against “inquisitorial” methods of interrogation, which presumably 
include harsh and intrusive questioning. Id. Though protection from “inquisitorial practices” 
could mean protection from even basic inquisitive questioning, Article 17 does not prohibit 
questioning but merely regulates the method of interrogation. Id. 
 23.  Id.  
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B. The Proper Interpretation of Coercion and Its Implication for the 
Legality of Mind-Reading Technologies 
This Note advocates for a different interpretation of ‘coercion,’ one 
that is consistent with the plain meaning of the word, the surrounding 
Article 17 statutory text, and the purpose behind Article 17’s inclusion 
in Geneva III.24 Coercion, plainly, denotes “the use of physical or moral 
force to compel to act or assent.”25 Common synonyms of coercion 
include “compulsion,” “force,” and “violence.”26 Thus, the purpose 
behind banning coercion was not to guard against some abstract loss of 
free will or to protect the POW’s duty to refrain from giving military 
information to the enemy. Rather, the purpose of Geneva III was to 
protect POWs from the physical pain and mental suffering that 
accompanies the use of force or threats, or, as one commentator noted, 
to “prevent [prisoners of war from] being brought down to the level of 
animals.”27 Since coercion as used in Article 17 permits interrogation 
techniques that do not cause physical pain or mental suffering, the use 
of painless mind-reading technology would probably not be considered 
coercion.28 
Ultimately, anticipated scientific developments make the topic of 
mind-reading both relevant and urgent. The meaning of the term 
‘coercion,’ however, will have implications that reach beyond the 
successful development of mind-reading technology. This Note’s 
argument that “harm” is a component of coercion requires the 
international community to agree on a threshold of harm (a topic 
 
 24.  See discussion infra Part III.  
 25.  Coercion, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH 
LANGUAGE (1961). 
 26.  Coercion, WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY OF SYNONYMS (1st ed. 1942).  
 27.  JEAN DE PREUX, COMMENTARY ON III GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE 
TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR 627 (Jean S. Pictet ed., A.P. de Henry trans., Int’l Comm. 
of the Red Cross 1960) [hereinafter 1960 Commentary]. 
 28.  See infra Part II. While the actual act of mind-reading does not cause physical pain per 
se, it could be argued that invading the mental privacy of an unwilling detainee causes mental 
suffering and therefore violates this Note’s definition of coercion. The author of this Note finds 
this argument unpersuasive. As used in Article 17, the ban on coercion prevents a capturing party 
from acquiring information by use of threats of physical violence or other harmful psychological 
techniques that produce mental suffering, such as forced nudity, sleep deprivation, hooding, 
sensory deprivation, and mock executions. Moreover, the invasiveness of mind-reading is 
essentially indistinguishable from the invasiveness of current methods of interrogation, which are 
not considered to produce mental harm. For example, the data yielded by neuroimaging 
applications is no more sensitive than data acquired through current methods of criminal 
interrogation, such as DNA testing and polygraph examinations. It is doubtful that reading 
someone’s mind constitutes mental coercion under Article 17, so this Note assumes that reading 
someone’s mind does not constitute mental coercion.   
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beyond the scope of this analysis). Moreover, an elemental formulation 
of coercion will reduce uncertainty surrounding permissible 
interrogation practices and provide a more concrete framework for 
countries to rely on when constructing interrogation policies. 
II. MIND-READING TECHNOLOGY: AN OVERVIEW 
Deception is a major component of human behavior.29 In the law 
enforcement context, deception frustrates the truth-finding process and 
slows down the administration of justice. The challenge deception 
imposes on the truth-finding process is why humans have always 
“wanted to peer inside each other’s minds.”30 Early efforts at mind-
reading linked lying to certain facial expressions.31 Humans, however, 
are rather poor at detecting deception when relying on their own senses 
and intuitions, which has led to relatively recent attempts to rely instead 
on technological instruments to detect deception.32 One prominent 
example is the polygraph, which associates physiological changes—
such as changes to heart rate, electrical skin conductance, and blood 
pressure—with deception.33 Despite inconsistent and lackluster results, 
the polygraph is still widely used by law enforcement and government 
agencies,34 a testament to the persisting human desire for lie detection. 
The search for a more reliable method of lie detection has recently 
focused on measures of the brain. Whether these neuro-based lie-
detectors are merely a product of wishful thinking or the first step in a 
technological breakthrough is the primary question Part II seeks to 
answer. The general takeaway is that while brain-based mind-reading 
technology is still too rudimentary for forensic use, it has serious 
potential to aid interrogators in differentiating lies from truth. 
Subsection A discusses one neuro-based method, fMRI-based lie 
detection. Subsection B focuses on another method, EEG-based 
 
 29.  Theodor Schaarschmidt, The Art of Lying, SCI. AM. (July 11, 2018), 
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/the-art-of-lying/.  
 30.  Eli Wolfe, Catching the Brain in a Lie: Is “Mind Reading” Deception Detection Sci-Fi—




 31.  Farah et al., supra note 3, at 123. 
 32.  Gershon Ben-Shakar & Eitan Elaad, The Validity of Psychophysiological Detection of 
Information with the Guilty Knowledge Test: A Meta-Analytic Review, 88 J. APPLIED PSYCH. 131, 
131 (2003).  
 33.  Id. at 131–32. 
 34.  Daniel D. Langleben & Jane Campbell Moriarty, Using Brain Imaging for Lie Detection: 
Where Science, Law and Research Policy Collide, 19 PSYCH. PUB. POL’Y & L. 222, 223 (2013).  
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memory detection. Subsection C discusses a new neuro-based method 
quite unlike the other two: real time extraction of current thoughts. 
A. fMRI-based Lie Detection 
The fMRI-based lie detection method allows for analysis of blood 
oxygen-level dependent (“BOLD”) activity, which would permit 
interrogators to differentiate lying from truth-telling.35 An fMRI is a 
medical imaging technology that makes use of strong magnetic fields 
to produce high-resolution, three-dimensional images of the body.36 
Every few seconds, the fMRI takes a snapshot of the current blood 
oxygenation levels in the brain.37 The use of fMRI as an interrogation 
device to detect deception is premised on two assumptions: 1) brain 
activity requires blood flow;38 and 2) several distinct areas of the brain 
are associated with lying.39 Brain activity requires oxygen, which is 
supplied by oxygenated hemoglobin in the blood.40 When a region of 
the brain increases its activity, blood flows to the region to satisfy the 
oxygen needs associated with the activity.41 Thus, oxygenated blood 
flows to certain parts of the brain when a subject is lying, which can be 
contrasted against the scan of a subject’s brain when said subject is at 
rest or telling the truth.42 
Two features of fMRI neuroimaging are relevant to Article 17 
analysis. First, the imaging is neither physically invasive nor painful. The 
subject of the scan simply lays down flat on a table that slides into a 
donut-shaped circular casing.43 Second, the device requires 
cooperation, as even a small “head movement could compromise the 
quality of the scan.”44 For this reason, restraints, such as foam pillows, 
are typically used to immobilize the subject.45 
 
 35.  Id. 
 36.  Id.  
 37.  Id. 
 38.  Farhan Hyder Sahito, Interrogational Neuroimaging: The Missing Element in Counter-
Terrorism, 3 INT’L J. INNOVATION & APPLIED STUD. 592, 595 (2013). 
 39.  Langleben & Moriarty, supra note 34, at 223. A meta-analysis of the existing fMRI-
based lie detection literature found that the regions that consistently showed deception-related 
activity were the “bilateral dorsolateral and ventrolateral prefrontal cortex, inferior parietal 
lobule, anterior insula and medial superior frontal cortex.” Farah et al., supra note 3, at 124. 
 40.  Wagner et al., fMRI and Lie Detection, MACARTHUR FOUND. RSCH. NETWORK ON L. 
& NEUROSCI. at 1 (Feb. 2016).  
 41.  See id. (explaining how neural activity is associated with oxygenated blood in the brain). 
 42.  Id. 
 43.  Thompson, supra note 9, at 1607.  
 44.  Id. at 1625.  
 45.  Id. 
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While fMRI-based lie detection was one of the first “mind-reading” 
technologies in the 21st century to gain significant attention from the 
scientific community, the technology has not developed into a viable lie 
detecting device. Studies have shown that fMRI-based lie detection is 
certainly better than chance at detecting deception, but not sufficiently 
accurate for admittance into a court setting.46 Beyond accuracy 
concerns, other scholars have shown that previous fMRI-based lie 
detection studies cannot be certain that the neural activity measured 
was associated with lying or memory recall.47 For example, subjects in 
three lab studies were tasked with “stealing” one of two potential 
objects and then asked to deny stealing both objects.48 The fMRI-based 
lie detection method accurately matched between 71 percent and 90 
percent of the subjects with the item they stole. A follow-up study, 
however, persuasively pointed out that subjects had a richer memory 
for the object they stole than the object they did not steal, and therefore 
the fMRI scan did not detect deception, but rather detected the 
subject’s familiarity with the stolen object.49 
Two technological advancements, however, have increased the 
validity of fMRI-based lie detection and also of fMRI-based memory 
detection. First, scientists have developed a new approach made 
possible by machine learning to analyze fMRI results: multi-voxel 
pattern analysis (“MVPA”).50 Classic fMRI-based lie detection 
associates certain regions of the brain (“voxels”) with lying.51 This 
approach, nevertheless, ignores the fact that neural activity is typically 
distributed throughout the brain.52 Rather than analyzing differences 
between brain regions, MVPA attempts to differentiate activities based 
on their unique distribution patterns throughout the brain.53 This novel 
approach has already “enabled significant advances in memory 
detection research.”54 Second, new neuroimaging technology, such as 
 
 46.  Andrew F. Kozel et al., Functional MRI Detection of Deception After Committing a 
Mock Sabotage Crime, 54 J. FORENSIC SCI. 220, 228 (2009).  
 47.  Wagner et al., supra note 40, at 2.  
 48.  Id.  
 49.  Id.  
 50.  Murphy & Rissman, supra note 4, at 21.  
 51.  Id.  
 52.  Id.  
 53.  See id. (“For example, there is not any one location of the brain that shows significantly 
greater activity when a subject perceives the letter X versus the letter O, and yet distributed fMRI 
activity patterns within visual brain areas are capable of not only being used to decode which 
letter a participant is perceiving on a given trial, but also which of the two letters a participant is 
imagining.”). 
 54.  Id. 
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Magnetic Particle Imaging (“MPI”), produces a brain scan that is one 
hundred times more sensitive than an fMRI and can capture very 
detailed information, whereas classic fMRI only offers a generalized 
snapshot.55 Feeding more granular information obtained from an MPI 
into a machine learning algorithm will significantly increase the 
likelihood of discovering patterns associated with lying and memory 
detection.56 
B. EEG Technology: Detecting Concealed Information 
Another brain-based approach that can be used to assess guilt or 
innocence is to determine familiarity with a distinct aspect of a crime. 
This determination can be made using an EEG to detect an electrical 
brainwave known as the P300.57 The P300 response is a measurable 
spike in the brain’s electrical activity that typically occurs milliseconds 
after exposure to a familiar stimulus.58 In a usual study, a subject is 
presented with a meaningful stimulus—one with which the subject has 
prior knowledge and experience—and a series of unmeaningful 
stimuli.59 For instance, if the murder weapon was a gun, the guilty 
suspect would be randomly shown a number of unmeaningful objects, 
such as a knife or a hammer, as well as the meaningful object, the gun.60 
The subject’s brain, recognizing the gun, would then elicit a P300 
response, but would fail to register a P300 response for the other 
objects, thus indicating guilty knowledge.61 
Several features of EEG-based memory detection are relevant in 
determining whether this form of mind-reading constitutes coercion. 
First, like fMRI-based lie detection, the process is neither physically 
invasive nor painful. Indeed, the only contact with a subject is through 
the placement of small electrodes on the subject’s scalp which register 
and measure brainwaves.62 Second, a subject does not have to verbally 
answer for the P300 response to register. Rather, the P300 response is 
subconscious and uncontrollable.63 Third, unlike fMRI-based lie 
 
 55.  Wolfe, supra note 30.  
 56.  See id. (quoting neuroscientist Bobby Azarian, “[n]ot only is ultra-high resolution brain 
imaging technology coming soon, we can predict lie detection to be one of its earliest 
applications.”). 
 57.  Murphy & Rissman, supra note 4, at 5.  
 58.  Id. at 6.  
 59.  Id. at 5.  
 60.  Id.   
 61.  Id. at 6.  
 62.  Id. at 5.  
 63.  Paul McGorrey, Mind-reading Technology Should not be Used to Solve Crime, THE 
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detection, EEG techniques require far less cooperation, since head 
movements do not necessarily distort data quality.64 Fourth, whereas an 
interrogator may need to physically subdue a subject to ensure accurate 
fMRI scans, brain waves can be measured by simply placing a cap on a 
subject’s head.65 Finally, unlike an fMRI, an EEG can measure a 
subject’s brainwaves while the subject is sitting comfortably in a chair.66 
Numerous studies have proven that EEG-based memory detection 
is accurate and replicable in a lab environment.67 Moreover, strategies 
have been developed to resist countermeasures, which are attempts by 
guilty subjects to distort EEG measurements.68 Lastly, new techniques 
leveraging machine learning algorithms are currently being explored in 
the hopes of improving the classification rate of guilty and innocent 
subjects.69 
Despite the technique’s developmental progress, most researchers 
believe EEG-based memory detection is not yet ready for forensic 
application. Regardless, some countries are now attempting to 
determine whether successful tests in controlled laboratory settings can 
be replicated in real-world interrogation scenarios.70 Other countries, 
defying expert consensus, have already licensed the technology for use 
in forensic assessments and preliminary criminal investigations.71 
 
CONVERSATION (September 25, 2017, 4:04 PM), https://theconversation.com/mind-reading-
technology-should-not-be-used-to-solve-crime-83874. 
 64.  Klaus Gramann & Max Plank, The Use of Electroencephalography in Neuroergonomics, 
in NEUROERGONOMICS: THE BRAIN AT WORK AND IN EVERYDAY LIFE 11, 11 (Hasan Ayaz & 
Frederic Dehais eds., 2018).  
 65.  Id. at 12.  
 66.  Id. at 11.  
 67.  See, e.g., John Meixner & J. Peter Rosenfeld, A Mock Terrorism Application of the P300-
based Concealed Information Test, 48 SOC’Y FOR PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGICAL RES. 149, 149 (2011). 
For example, in a mock-terrorism lab study, participants pretended that they were part of a deadly 
terrorist plot. Id. at 150. The participants in the terrorism category then wrote a letter to the 
“leader” of the plot revealing that there would be a bombing in Houston in July. Id. Later, when 
the participants were shown keywords (e.g., “bomb,” “Houston,” “July”) the researchers were 
able to correlate P300 waves with guilty knowledge 100 percent of the time. Id. at 152. For 
unknown aspects of the crime, the researchers were able to identify ten of the twelve participants 
assigned to the terrorist group and did not misidentify any “innocent” participants. Id. 
 68.  See generally Michel Funicelli et al., An Independent Validation of the EEG Based 
Complex Trial Protocol with Autobiographical Data and Corroboration of its Resistance to a 
Cognitively Charged Countermeasure, APPLIED PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY & BIOFEEDBACK (2021); J. 
Peter Rosenfeld et al., The Complex Trial Protocol (CTP): A New Countermeasure Resistant 
Accurate P300-Based Method for Detection of Concealed Information, 45 SOC’Y FOR 
PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGICAL RES. 906 (2008).  
 69.  Murphy & Rissman, supra note 4, at 15. 
 70.  Univ. of Canterbury, Brainwave Activity That Reveals Knowledge of Crime (January 16, 
2020), https://medicalxpress.com/news/2020-01-brainwave-reveals-knowledge-crime.html. 
 71.  Murphy & Rissman, supra note 4, at 18.  
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Overall, EEG-based memory detection is a more promising technology 
than fMRI-based lie detection and requires minimal invasiveness and 
cooperation in an interrogation setting. 
C. Future Technology: Real-Time Thought Extraction 
Advancements in artificial intelligence and machine learning have 
made real-time thought extraction possible. While fMRI-based lie 
detection detects a simple mental attitude (e.g., deception), and EEG-
based memory detection focuses on recognition, real-time thought 
extraction has the potential to create “a live recording of what is going 
on in a person’s mind.”72 Thanks to both fMRI and EEG technology, 
scientists can already decode rudimentary information about what a 
“person is currently perceiving, feeling, thinking about, imagining, 
remembering, attending to, intending to do, or even dreaming about.”73 
Researchers believe it is only a matter of time before technologies 
can decode a subject’s internal dialogue and visually reconstruct the 
subject’s live thoughts.74 In a recent study, for example, subjects 
watched a movie trailer while an fMRI scanned their brains.75 The 
fMRI data was then translated by an artificial intelligence program, 
which recreated the trailer on a computer screen with a surprising level 
of accuracy and detail.76 While current technology only scratches the 
surface of human thought, technology capable of producing an accurate 
recreation of current human thought may be only ten to fifteen years 
away from application in the law enforcement realm.77 
As the Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues 
 
 72.  Gerben Meynen, Brain-Based Mind Reading in Forensic Psychiatry: Exploring 
Possibilities and Perils, 4 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 311, 317–18 (2017). 
 73.  Murphy & Rissman, supra note 4, at 3.  
 74.  Jerry Kaplan, The Machines That Will Read Your Mind, THE WALL ST. J. (April 5, 2019, 
10:55 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-machines-that-will-read-your-mind-11554476156.  
 75.  Yasmin Anwar, Scientists Use Brain Imaging to Reveal the Movies in our Mind, 
BERKELEY NEWS (September 22, 2011), https://news.berkeley.edu/2011/09/22/brain-movies/. 
 76.  Id. Researchers have also used an EEG to reconstruct videos from subjects’ neural 
activities. See, e.g., Matthew North, AI Recreates Videos People are Watching by Reading Their 
Minds, NEW SCIENTIST (November 26, 2019), https://www.newscientist.com/article/2224866-ai-
recreates-videos-people-are-watching-by-reading-their-minds/. In one study, brainwave activity 
was measured as the subjects watched video clips that included nature scenes, people on jet skis, 
and human expressions. Id. The artificial intelligence program then reconstructed 234 videos and 
also successfully categorized 210 videos, providing tags such as waterfalls, extreme sports, or 
human faces. Id.  
 77.   See Cherly Ann, A Mind-Reading A.I., DATA DRIVEN INV. (December 7, 2019), 
https://medium.datadriveninvestor.com/a-mind-reading-a-i-83e781ce927b (“Instead of a police 
officer asking questions, they’ll stick a helmet on to decide what it is that’s going through your 
mind.”).   
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noted, these various neuroscience techniques “might soon reveal … 
whether an individual recognizes a face or an object, possesses 
knowledge relevant to a legal proceeding, is lying or telling the truth, 
or even allow reconstruction of the visual imagery seen at the time of 
the crime.”78 The legality of these promising interrogation techniques 
depends upon the interpretation of the term coercion in Article 17. 
III. AN ELEMENTAL FORMULATION OF COERCION 
This section argues that coercion, in the context of Article 17, 
requires the imposition of physical and/or mental discomfort (harm 
element) on the POW by way of force or threats (force element) for 
the purpose of compelling the POW to reveal information (compulsion 
requirement). This section further argues that torture is an aggravated 
form of coercion, as torture requires the infliction of more severe pain 
and suffering. Thus, coercion sets the minimum threshold level of 
severity necessary to violate Article 17. 
This analysis will proceed in two parts. Subsection A summarizes 
two views on coercion: the Free Will Approach and the Duty Approach. 
Subsection B critiques these two approaches and argues for an 
alternative formulation. 
A. The Free Will Approach and the Duty Approach 
1. The Free Will Approach 
The Free Will Approach focuses on a POW’s autonomy to choose 
whether to divulge information.79 Any method which compromises a 
POW’s ability to choose constitutes coercion.80 Since mind-reading 
technology extracts valuable cognitive information against a subject’s 
will, use of this interrogation method violates Article 17.81 This approach 
 
 78.  PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, GRAY 
MATTERS: TOPICS AT THE INTERSECTION OF NEUROSCIENCE, ETHICS, AND SOCIETY at 102 
(2015).  
 79.  Thompson, supra note 9, at 1617. See also JENNIFER ELSEA, CONGRESSIONAL 
RESEARCH SERVICE, LAWFULNESS OF INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES UNDER THE GENEVA 
CONVENTIONS at 15 (2004) (“The pertinent question appears to be whether the person subject to 
treatment designed to influence his conduct is able to exercise a choice and complies willingly or 
has no choice other than to comply.”). Notice, this definition is slightly different than the Free 
Will Approach’s, as it seemingly requires “treatment designed to influence” the subject. Id. Thus, 
mind-reading technology which does not require the subject’s cooperation might not be coercive 
under this definition, since the technology is not influencing the subject to do anything.  
 80.  Thompson, supra note 9, at 1617. 
 81.  Id.  
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does not require any application of harmful force on a subject; the only 
relevant factor is whether the method in question “has robbed the 
[subject] of his free will to choose.”82 A notable endorser of this 
approach is the International Committee of the Red Cross (“ICRC”).83 
Two sources of United States’ law seem to have heavily influenced 
adoption of this broad interpretation:84 Manuals regulating intelligence 
gathering and Supreme Court jurisprudence.85 Under Supreme Court 
precedent, a confession is the product of coercion if the “defendant’s 
will was overborne or if his confession was not the product of a rational 
intellect and a free will.”86 In Townsend v. Sain, for example, the 
Supreme Court opined that a confession elicited while the defendant 
was under the influence of a “truth serum” would be inadmissible in 
court, because a truth serum would compromise a defendant’s ability 
to freely and rationally choose what information to reveal.87 
Despite this holding, a Congressional Research Service Report (the 
“Report”) analyzing the lawfulness of interrogation techniques under 
the Geneva Conventions, found that “the standards that apply in 
criminal cases . . . probably do not apply to a determination of coercion 
under the Geneva Conventions.”88 The Report offers no reason for this 
conclusion, but two compelling reasons exist which make it doubtful 
the Geneva drafters meant to incorporate this understanding of 
coercion. First, none of the drafting materials or official statements ever 
mention the Free Will Approach.89 Second, the rights of a criminal 
defendant in the United States are protected by the United States 
Constitution, which has been interpreted to protect fundamental fair 
trial rights, such as the right against self-incrimination and the right to 
remain silent. POWs, however, derive their rights from international 
treaties, and under Geneva III, POWs do not benefit from the 
equivalent of domestic fair trial rights unless they are suspected 
 
 82.  Id. 
 83.  2020 ICRC Commentary, supra note 11, art. 17 (“The decisive factor in determining 
whether coercion has occurred or is occurring is whether the method used deprives or impairs the 
prisoner of the exercise of free will and autonomy.”). 
 84.  See, e.g., Dep’t of the Army, FM 34-52, Intelligence Interrogation ¶ 1-8 (1992) 
[hereinafter FM 34-52] (“Physical or mental torture and coercion revolve around eliminating the 
source’s free will.”). 
 85.  Thompson, supra note 9, at 1615.  
 86.  Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 307 (1963) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 87.  Id. On the other hand, to assert coercion as a criminal defense, a defendant must show 
that he was under an objectively reasonable fear of imminent injury or death when he committed 
the alleged offense. D’Aquino v. United States, 192 F.2d 338, 359 (9th Cir. 1951). 
 88.  ELSEA, supra note 79, at 14.  
 89.  See discussion infra Part III. B.  
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criminals or are facing prosecution.90 Moreover, the vast majority of 
POW interrogations are conducted to acquire strategic and tactical 
military information, not to obtain evidence of criminal guilt.91 
The more influential source has been the United States Armed 
Forces’ now-replaced Field Manual 34-52 Intelligence Interrogation 
(FM 34-52). Identical to its successor document FM 2-22.3, FM 34-52 
states “[p]hysical or mental torture and coercion revolve around 
eliminating the source’s free will” and are “expressly prohibited by . . . 
Articles 13 and 17 [of Geneva III]”92 The ICRC’s Commentary of 2020 
on Article 17 (the “2020 ICRC Commentary”) cites FM 34-52 as proof 
that coercion includes any method that impairs POWs’ exercise of free 
will or autonomy.93 
FM 34-52, however, does not actually support the broad 
interpretation of coercion assigned by the ICRC. First, that both torture 
and coercion “revolve around eliminating the source’s free will” does 
not reduce the cause of action for coercion and torture to simply one 
element (whether the information was received voluntarily). Rather, 
“revolves around” merely acknowledges the goal of tortious and 
coercive questioning: to acquire information against the detainee’s 
wishes. Torture, for example, also requires the infliction of “severe pain 
or suffering.”94 Similarly, though the goal of coercive interrogation 
techniques is to acquire information against a subject’s wishes, this does 
not imply that the only element of coercion is loss of free will. 
Second, the 2020 ICRC Commentary omits the important fact that 
FM 34-52 specifically defines coercion “as actions designed to 
unlawfully induce another to compel an act against one’s will.”95 The 
compulsion requirement is crucial to assessing the legality of mind-
reading because the techniques discussed in Part II do not require 
detainees to affirmatively act against their wills. Lastly, the 2020 ICRC 
Commentary seemingly relies on FM 34-52, even though it was 
replaced in 2009 by FM 2-22.3.96 While FM 2-22.3 similarly contains the 
 
 90.  See Robin Geiß, Name, Rank, and Serial Number and the Right to Remain Silent, 87 
INT’L REV. RED CROSS 721, 731—32 (2005) (Arguing that POWs gain the protection of fair trial 
rights when “questioning as to their individual involvement in potentially criminal activities 
begins.”) Note, while a country may accord all POWs fair trial rights starting at the beginning of 
capture, no country is bound to do so under Geneva III. Id. at 729.  
 91.  Id.  
 92.  FM 34-52, supra note 84, at ¶ 1-8.  
 93.  2020 ICRC Commentary, supra note 11, art. 17 n. 39. 
 94.  ELSEA, supra note 79, at 9.  
 95.  FM 34-52 at ¶1-8 (emphasis added).  
 96.  See Exec. Order No. 13491, 74 C.F.R. 4893 (2009) (requiring CIA and other Executive 
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“revolves around” provision,97 it also contains a list of illustrative 
examples which constitute coercion: 
Although no single comprehensive source defines impermissible coercion, certain 
acts are clearly prohibited. Certain prohibited physical coercion may be obvious, 
such as physically abusing the subject of the screening or interrogation. Other 
forms of impermissible coercion may be more subtle, and may include threats to 
turn the individual over to others to be abused; subjecting the individual to 
impermissible humiliating or degrading treatment; implying harm to the individual 
or his property. Other prohibited actions include implying a deprivation of 
applicable protections guaranteed by law because of a failure to cooperate; 
threatening to separate parents from their children; or forcing a protected person 
to guide [American] forces in a dangerous area.98 
These impermissible examples all share a common attribute: they 
cause unpleasant and painful physical or mental suffering. Moreover, 
the examples of mental suffering seem limited to threats of violence or 
substantial punishment, such as separating parents from their 
children.99 Inputting mind-reading technology into the list, as the Free 
Will Approach would mandate, would be a rather awkward addition. 
Overall, the ICRC’s position rests on shaky ground, as support for the 
Free Will Approach is absent in the Article 17 text,100 the drafting 
materials,101 and the ICRC’s own cited materials.102 
Furthermore, application of the Free Will Approach poses a 
number of significant theoretical and practical problems. One such 
problem is that the Free Will Approach seemingly suggests that 
coercion is always successful. If a subject does not reveal the desired 
information, the subject’s free will has not been eliminated and there 
was therefore no coercion. This inference leads to the rather bizarre 
conclusion that an interrogator can permissibly inflict the maximum 
allowable suffering short of torture, which requires “severe” pain,103 as 
long as the POW does not reveal information, yet cannot painlessly 
read the POW’s mind. Even more strange, this suggestion implies that 
the legality of a particular interrogation technique is totally dependent 
on the outcome. Take, for example, one situation in which a soldier is 
subject to significant abuse short of torture: Wall-standing, loud noise, 
 
agencies to proceed with interrogations “strictly in accord with the principles, processes, 
conditions, and limitations” FM 2-22.3 prescribes).  
 97.  See FM 22-2.3, supra note 18, at 5-26 (“Physical or mental torture and coercion revolve 
around eliminating the source’s free will, and are expressly prohibited . . . .”). 
 98.  Id. at 5-22.  
 99.  Id.  
 100.  See discussion infra Part III. B. 
 101.  See discussion infra Part III. B. 
 102.  2020 ICRC Commentary, supra note 11, art. 17 n. 39. 
 103.  See infra notes 144–55.  
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sleep deprivation, hooding, and deprivation of food and water.104 The 
soldier musters the will to resist relinquishing critical military 
intelligence. Under the Free Will Approach, the techniques used in this 
situation do not technically constitute ‘coercion.’ Imagine, however, the 
same soldier in an alternative scenario reveals valuable intelligence. 
Now, these same techniques would constitute ‘coercion.’ 
A more generous interpretation is that the Free Will Approach 
considers coercive any interrogation method that may objectively 
collapse the POW’s ability to rationally choose. Even with this 
interpretation, the previous problem persists: what acts may 
“objectively” destroy a POW’s autonomy and free will to choose? Are 
a few slaps and shaking objectively linked to the destruction of a 
POW’s free will? The dividing line between permissible interrogation 
methods and acts that “objectively” deprive a POW of his free will is 
not readily apparent. 
2. The Duty Approach 
The Duty Approach is neither widespread nor pervasive in 
commentaries on Article 17. In fact, the only mention of the approach 
is in an old Judge Advocate General (“JAG”) Opinion in response to 
an inquiry about the legality of truth serum.105 In response to the 
inquiry, the JAG concluded that the use of a truth serum during 
interrogations violates Article 17.106 The reason, according to the JAG, 
is that Article 17 was enacted to protect every POW’s duty “to refrain 
from giving military information to his captors.”107 Thus, any 
“inquisitorial” interrogation method beyond standard questioning 
techniques must be banned to protect the POW’s obligation to remain 
silent.108 If, as the JAG contends, Article 17 was passed to protect the 
POW’s duty to refrain from revealing damaging information to the 
 
 104.  Ireland v. United Kingdom, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 96 (1978), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57506. 
 105.  See Use of “Truth Serum”, supra note 22, at 708–09 (finding that the use of “truth 
serum” in questioning POWs would violate the Geneva Conventions). For information about the 
history and usage of truth serums in interrogations, see generally Brendan Borrell, What is Truth 
Serum?, SCI. AM. (December 4, 2008), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/what-is-truth-
serum/ (recounting what truth serum is and its history vis-à-vis interrogation purposes). Truth 
serums are drugs, such as sodium amytal and sodium pentothal, that were administered under the 
belief that they “made people unable to censor themselves and they would just empty their 
memories into a narrative statement.” Id.  
 106.  Use of “Truth Serum,” supra note 22, at 709. 
 107.  Id. at 708–09. 
 108.  See id. (affirming the prohibition of “coercion and treatment” in part based on POW 
duty to refrain from divulging information). 
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enemy, then the use of a mind-reading device, like the use of a truth 
serum, is surely prohibited. Such a device would eviscerate the POW’s 
obligation to conceal information and would thus defeat the purpose 
of Article 17. 
The JAG’s approach rests on a misinterpretation of the ICRC’s 
1960 Commentary on Article 17 (the “1960 Commentary”).109 This 
ICRC analysis, which the JAG relied on, states that beyond ascertaining 
the POW’s identity: 
The Detaining power may very naturally be tempted to obtain additional 
information from the prisoner, both in regard to himself and concerning the 
circumstances which preceded his capture, for this is obviously of interest from the 
military point of view. The prisoner may, and indeed must, refrain from giving 
military information to the Detaining Power; he must therefore be protected 
against any inquisitorial practices on the part of that Power.110 
The 1960 Commentary does not state that Article 17 was adopted 
to protect a POW’s duty to refrain from revealing damaging 
information, as the JAG opinion claims. Rather, it simply recognizes the 
predicament of the POW: he is powerless in the hands of the detaining 
party whose interests directly conflict with his. The POW, under 
domestic law, must not reveal any damaging information or else he 
risks punishment. The detaining party wants to extract as much 
information as possible. Given that interrogation is inevitable,111 
Article 17 was adopted to ensure that the detainer did not abuse its 
power in its quest to elicit information, and therefore provided the 
POW basic humanitarian protection.112 The diplomatic discussions 
preceding the adoption of Article 17 say as much, noting that the 
purpose behind Article 17’s ban on coercive interrogation was “to give 
fuller protection to [POWs] against pressure on the part of a capturing 
 
 109.  See 1960 Commentary, supra note 27, at 156 (acknowledging the difficult circumstances 
facing POWs, but stopping short of stating a duty to refrain from revealing damaging 
information).  
 110.  Id.  
 111.  The notes of the Special Committee responsible for drafting Article 17 state “[i]t was 
idle to harbor illusions. A state which had captured prisoners of war would always try to obtain 
military information from them.” Preparatory Works of the Geneva Convention, 5th Meeting of 
Committee II, Friday 29 April 1949.  
 112.  HOWARD LEVIE, PRISONERS OF WAR IN INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 106 (vol. 
59, 1979) (“From the moment of capture there also arises the problem of the extent to which the 
Detaining Power may seek or extract information from the new prisoner of war. In Article 17 the 
[Third Geneva] Convention has attempted . . . to remedy the deplorable situation in this regard 
which existed during World War II.”). See also Delbert D. Smith, The Geneva Prisoner of War 
Convention: An Appraisal, 42 N.Y.U. L. REV. 880, 884 (1967) (noting that the rules coming out 
of the Third Geneva Convention attempted to “create a ‘right’ to decent and humane treatment 
for the prisoner . . . .”). 
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state that wished to obtain information of a military character.”113 Thus, 
Article 17 was not constructed to protect the POW’s obligation to 
withhold information. Such an argument rests on the unfounded 
assumption that the framers of Geneva III favored concealing 
information over eliciting it, when in fact they simply sought protection 
for powerless POWs. 
B. A More Faithful Interpretation of Coercion: Protecting POWs from 
Harmful Interrogation Techniques 
This section primarily argues that “coercion” as used in Article 17 
contains a harm element. This definition derives from: 1) the plain 
meaning of the word “coercion” at the time Article 17 was drafted; 2) 
the term’s neighboring statutory text; and 3) a comparison of Article 17 
with its predecessor in the 1929 Geneva Convention.114 Moreover, this 
definition squares with the purpose behind the prohibition of coercive 
interrogation: to protect POWs from harm and suffering that 
accompanies it. This purpose is evident from the historical context 
behind Article 17’s inclusion in Geneva III: the brutal mistreatment of 
POWs during World War I and World War II. 
1. Textual Analysis 
Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, statutory 
interpretation begins with the plain meaning of the text because the 
statute conveys the drafters’ purpose.115 Statutorily undefined words 
are given their ordinary meaning.116 In United States jurisprudence, 
ordinary meaning is typically derived from dictionaries from when the 
statute was enacted.117 When Geneva III was drafted and ratified, the 
unambiguous generalized definition of coercion contemplated three of 
the four elements specified above: (1) the use or threat of physical 
and/or mental force against (2) another (3) in order to compel a certain 
 
 113.  Final Record of the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of 1949, at 250 (Berne 1949), 
https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/Dipl-Conf-1949-Final_Vol-2-A.pdf. 
 114.  Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 17, Jul. 27, 1929, 47 Stat. 
2021, 2 Bevans 932 [hereinafter 1929 Convention]. 
 115.  See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31(1), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 
331 (“A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be 
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”). 
 116.  Id. 
 117.  See MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. AT&T, 512 U.S. 218, 227–28 (1994) (assessing the meaning 
of the word “modify” by looking at various dictionary definitions published around the time the 
statute was enacted).  
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course of conduct against the subject’s will.118 Even the 2020 ICRC 
Commentary recognizes this as the “ordinary” definition, but 
inexplicably adopts the Free Will Approach in the very next sentence.119 
Absent from the plain meaning definition, however, is the harm 
element. Instead, the harm element is inferred from the verb “inflict” 
in the surrounding statutory text. Article 17 reads: “No physical or 
mental torture, nor any other form of coercion, may be inflicted on 
prisoners of war to secure from them information of any kind 
whatever.”120 Rewriting Article 17 in the active voice, the Article would 
state: ‘The detaining power may not inflict any physical or mental 
torture, nor any other form of coercion, on prisoners of war to secure 
from them information of any kind whatever.’ In common usage, what 
is “inflicted” is usually something that is very unpleasant or painful that 
results in discomfort or suffering to the recipient.121 In 1961, Webster’s 
Dictionary defined “inflict” to mean “to lay (a blow) on, cause 
(something damaging or painful) to be endured.”122 Similarly, the 
Oxford Universal Dictionary defined inflict to mean “to lay on as a 
stoke, blow, or wound.”123 Thus, properly understood from the context, 
the prohibition on coercion is the prohibition against inflictions of cruel 
and inhuman suffering in order to secure information.124 
 
 118.  See, e.g., Coercion, supra note 25. This definition was also used in other legal fields: For 
example, in the labor law field, coercion was defined as “pressure exerted on employees to deter 
them from participating, or to impel them to participate, in self-organization and collective 
bargaining or to influence their choice of a bargaining agent.” DICTIONARY OF LABOR LAW 
TERMS (2d ed. 1953). Moreover, the modern definition is essentially the same: Oxford Dictionary 
defines coercion as “the practice of persuading someone to do something by using force or 
threats.” OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2000). Note that the ordinary dictionary 
definition requires two more elements than is required in the Free Will Approach. 
 119.  See 2020 ICRC Commentary, supra note 11, art. 17 (“The decisive factor in determining 
whether coercion . . . is occurring is whether the method used deprives or impairs the prisoner of 
the exercise of free will and autonomy.”).  
 120.  Geneva III, supra note 11, art. 17 (emphasis added).  
 121.  For example, Cambridge Dictionary defines inflict as “to force someone to experience 
something very unpleasant“ and provides this example: “The suffering inflicted on these children 
was unimaginable.” Inflict, CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY (2021) 
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/inflict. According to Oxford Languages, to 
“inflict” means to “cause (something unpleasant or painful) to be suffered by someone or 
something” and provides this illustrative example: “[T]hey inflicted serious injuries on three other 
men.” Inflict, OXFORD LANGUAGES 
https://www.google.com/search?q=inflict&oq=inflict&aqs=chrome.0.69i59j35i39j69i59l2j0i433j6
9i60l3.978j1j7&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8. 
 122.  Inflict, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH 
(1961).  
 123.  Inflict, THE OXFORD UNIVERSAL DICTIONARY ON HISTORICAL PRINCIPLES (1972).  
 124.  Other scholars also understand “coercive interrogation” to entail a harm element. See 
Glod & Smith, supra note 16, at 148 (“Thus, Article 17 serves to protect the prisoner from yielding 
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The Free Will Approach cannot be squared with the inclusion of the 
verb “inflict.” Inflicting “the loss of autonomy” or the “subversion of 
the free will” does not comport with the unpleasant and painful 
connotation that is usually associated with the term “inflict.” Nor is 
Article 17’s phraseology a common way of expressing the prohibition 
on subverting someone’s will. It would be unnatural, for example, to 
describe an interrogator’s conduct, which includes administering mild 
physical blows and aggressive shouting, as “inflicting a loss of 
autonomy” on the recipient. Ultimately, if the drafters truly intended 
to communicate the Free Will Approach, they would have constructed 
the coercion prohibition in an altogether different way. 
The inclusion of the phrase “other form” in Article 17 provides 
further textual evidence that coercion requires an infliction of suffering 
and abuse. Article 17 bans physical torture, mental torture, and “any 
other form of coercion.”125 The statute does not state ‘no physical or 
mental torture, nor any form of coercion, may be inflicted on POWs.’ If 
Article 17 was written that way, it would perhaps suggest that coercion 
and torture are distinct prohibitions. Rather, the inclusion of the term 
“other” makes it clear that physical and mental torture are examples, 
among “other[s],” of coercion. Members of a common category must 
have some shared characteristic that unites them. Since torture falls 
under the umbrella category of coercion in Article 17, the “other” 
prohibited “forms” of coercion must have at least one shared quality 
with torture. 
The most prominent element of torture is the high degree of 
physical or mental pain.126 Given that physical and mental torture were 
the illustrative examples of coercion chosen by the drafters, it is likely 
that this prominent characteristic is the common element of torture and 
other forms of coercion. Put in more plain terms, it would be strange if 
a neighbor, when asked to identify an act constituting “mental torture,” 
“physical torture,” and “any other form of coercion,” responded with 
 
to a temptation to divulge information due to fear of pain and to guard the prisoner from other 
external pressures.”); Maria F. Blanc, Moral Permissibility and Legitimacy of the Use of Coercive 
Interrogations: Implications for the Intelligence Professional, Participating Health-Care 
Professionals, and Society, 1 INT’L J. INTEL. ETHICS 122, 123 (2010) (“[T]he essence of coercive 
interrogation is the imposition of a time-limited physical and mental discomfort on the 
interrogatee so as to force information out of him.”).  
 125.  Geneva III, supra note 11, art. 17 (emphasis added).  
 126.  Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment art. 1, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (defining torture as “any act by which severe 
pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person.”) (emphasis 
added). 
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‘reading someone’s mind using fMRI.’ The differing factor, of course, 
would be the degree of pain inflicted, as torture requires the infliction 
of “severe pain,” whereas other forms of ill-treatment typically require 
milder inflictions. 
Indeed, in other statutory contexts in which torture was deemed an 
aggravated form of a less severe treatment, courts have similarly found 
that the common element binding torture and the less severe treatment 
was the infliction of pain.127 For example, Article 3 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (the “European Convention”) states: 
“[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment.”128 The European Court on Human Rights 
(the “ECHR”) has interpreted this provision to mean that torture is an 
aggravated form of inhuman treatment that requires the infliction of 
very severe and cruel suffering.129 In Ireland v. United Kingdom, the 
court addressed the use of certain British military interrogation 
techniques—wall-standing, loud noise, sleep deprivation, hooding, and 
deprivation of food and water—against suspected members of the Irish 
Republican Army.130 The ECHR held that these techniques did not rise 
to the level of torture.131 In its decision, the ECHR first noted that the 
principal difference between torture and other inhuman treatment is 
“the intensity of the suffering inflicted.”132 Torture, the court concluded, 
carries a “special stigma” and should be limited only to those practices 
of a “particular intensity or cruelty.”133 The court then held that the 
interrogation techniques did not possess the requisite severity level to 
 
 127.  See Prosecutor v. Br anin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, 483 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia Sept. 1, 2004) (noting that “[t]he seriousness of the pain or suffering sets 
torture apart from other forms of mistreatment.”). Moreover, Article 1(2) of the Declaration on 
the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment states: “Torture constitutes an aggravated and deliberate 
form of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” G.A. Res. 3452 art. 1(2) (Dec. 9, 
1975). 
 128.  Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953), amended by Protocols Nos. 3, 5, 8, & 11 
(which entered into force Sept. 21, 1970, Dec. 20, 1971, Jan. 1, 1990, and Nov. 1, 1998, respectively) 
[hereinafter ECHR], available at https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/convention_eng.pdf 
(emphasis added). 
 129.  Ireland v. United Kingdom, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 167 (1978), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57506 (finding that since the techniques used caused 
“physical and mental suffering” and “led to acute psychiatric disturbances during interrogation” 
they fell under “inhuman treatment” as defined in the European Convention).  
 130.  Id. at ¶ 96.  
 131.  Id. at ¶ 168. 
 132.  Id. at ¶ 167. 
 133.  Id.  
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constitute torture, but did find that the interrogation practices 
represented inhuman and cruel treatment.134 
On the other hand, where acts cause little or no physical or mental 
suffering, the ECHR has declined to find any violation of the 
prohibition against inhuman treatment: In Rainen v. Finland, the court 
found that the act of physically restraining a person for two hours, even 
though completely unnecessary, did not attain “the minimum level of 
severity” necessary to find a violation of the European Convention.135 
Thus, in other statutes which, like Article 17, deem torture an extreme 
form of less severe treatment, tribunals have found a minimum level of 
suffering required to constitute a violation of the less severe treatment. 
2. Purpose and Historical Context 
The drafters’ intent, as evidenced by historical context and their 
preparatory work, also confirms that coercion requires the infliction of 
harm.136 Article 17 derives from an analogous provision in the 1929 
Geneva Convention (the “1929 Convention”).137 The corresponding 
provision of the 1929 Convention, Article 5, provided that “[no] 
pressure shall be exercised on prisoners to obtain information 
regarding the situation in their armed forces or their country.”138 Article 
17 expanded the ban on “pressure” to prohibit “physical or mental 
torture, []or any other form of coercion.” While “pressure” was 
changed to “coercion” in Geneva III, English translations of the 1929 
Convention typically substitute “coercion” for “pressure” in Article 
5,139 as do scholarly commentaries.140 Thus, adding color to the word 
“pressure” would shed light on the precise meaning of the word 
“coercion” in Geneva III. 
 
 134.  Id. at ¶ 168. 
 135.  Raninen v. Finland, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 54, 59 (1997), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-58123. 
 136.  Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a treaty “shall be interpreted . . . 
in the light of its object and purpose.” See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 
115. When discerning the treaty’s purpose and intent, it is proper to consult the preparatory work 
of the treaty and the circumstances surrounding its adoption. Id. 
 137.  1929 Convention, supra note 114, art. 5. 
 138.  Id. 
 139.  For example, the official interpretation of the 1929 Geneva Convention from French 
released by the Office of the Registrar in the United States contained the word “coercion” in 
place of “pressure” in Article 5. Herbert Hoover, A Proclamation by the President of the United 
States (August 1932), https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/geneva02.asp#art5. 
 140.  See, e.g., John E. Wehrum Jr., The Status of United States Prisoners of War Under the 
Code of Conduct for the Armed Forces, 21 CATH. U. L. REV. 133, 141 (1971) (quoting Article 5 
of the 1929 Convention and substituting “coercion” for “pressure.”).  
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a. The 1929 Convention 
Article 5 in the 1929 Convention codified the growing international 
sentiment that a detaining power should not use violent interrogation 
tactics against detainees to obtain military information.141 For example, 
the 1863 Lieber Code, one of the first modern attempts to codify the 
law of war, states that the “the modern law of war permits no longer 
the use of any violence against prisoners in order to extort the desired 
information or to punish them for having given false information.”142 
International law, however, lagged behind state action on this matter 
such that by the start of World War I in 1914, no international treaty 
formally outlawed harmful interrogations practices.143 
To fill this void in international law, countries signed special 
bilateral POW agreements with rival belligerents to ensure humane 
treatment of their captured soldiers.144 For example, a 1918 Agreement 
between the British and German governments (the “1918 
Agreement”) strictly forbade “forcible means of any kind to compel 
prisoners of war to give information about their army or their 
country”145 Moreover, the 1918 Agreement provided that “[p]risoners 
of war, who refuse to give information may neither be threatened nor 
insulted nor subjected to any other treatment that puts them in a less 
favourable position than other prisoners.”146 The language used here is 
similar to the language used in Article 5 of the 1929 Convention, and 
nearly identical to the language used in Article 17.147 These similarities 
strongly suggest that Article 17 sought to proscribe harmful 
 
 141.  See LEVIE, supra note 112, at 107 (“Prohibitions on the use of force to compel prisoners 
of war to divulge information to the enemy are not a recent development.”).  
 142.  U.S. Department of War, Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United 
States in the Field, General Orders No. 100, Apr. 24, 1863 (emphasis added).  
 143.  The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, for example, imposed upon POWs the 
obligation to reveal their identity to the enemy, but did not impose any specific obligation on 
detaining parties to refrain from employing harmful interrogation practices beyond a general 
requirement of humane treatment. See LEVIE, supra note 112, at 107. 
 144.  Id. 
 145.  Agreement Between the British and German Governments Concerning Combatant 
Prisoners of War and Civilians, Gr. Brit-Ger., July 14, 1918, 111 BFSP 279 (emphasis added).  
 146.  Id. art. XXIX. 
 147.  Compare id., with 1929 Convention, supra note 114, art. 5 (“No pressure shall be 
exercised on prisoners to obtain information regarding the situation in their armed forces or their 
country. Prisoners who refuse to reply may not be threatened, insulted, or exposed to 
unpleasantness or disadvantages of any kind whatsoever.”) and Geneva III, supra note 11, art. 17 
(“No physical or mental torture, nor any other form of coercion, may be inflicted on prisoners of 
war to secure from them information of any kind whatever. Prisoners of war who refuse to answer 
may not be threatened, insulted, or exposed to any unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of 
any kind.”).  
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applications of force. 
Few reported post-World War II cases discussed violations of 
Article 5 of the 1929 Convention.148 One case, however, found that 
unlawful interrogation under Article 5 required physical or mental 
suffering be inflicted on a POW.149 In the Trial of Erich Killinger and 
Four Others, three German military interrogators were accused of 
contravening Article 5.150 To secure information, the interrogators 
allegedly heated the POWs’ cells to an uncomfortable level, deprived 
the POWs of medical attention, and physically struck the POWs.151 As 
a matter of law, the court concluded that in order to prove unlawful 
interrogation under Article 5, the prosecution must prove that the 
“interrogation amounted to what could be described as physical or 
mental ill-treatment.”152 The court found that the practices constituted 
ill-treatment and convicted the German interrogators.153 Thus, the 
Killinger decision confirmed that Article 5’s prohibition against 
applying “pressure” is similar to the Lieber Code’s prohibition against 
“violence” and the 1918 agreement’s prohibition against using “forcible 
means.” 
b. Geneva III 
The impetus for Article 17 was the need to clarify the prohibition 
against harmful questioning in the face of widespread violations of the 
1929 Convention during World War II.154 The framers did not advocate 
for additional limitations on interrogation techniques, but merely a 
more precise formulation of the term “coercion” to limit 
interrogational discretion.155 Thus, Article 17 preserved Article 5’s harm 
requirement. The circumstances surrounding the reformulation of 
Article 17 and the drafters’ own statements leave little room for doubt 
 
 148.  See LEVIE, supra note 114, at 291 (Noting that there are relatively few reported “World 
War II (1939-45) war crimes trials involving the question of allowable and prohibited methods of 
interrogating prisoners of war in the quest for information of military value.”).  
 149.  See Trial Of Erich Killinger And Four Others, 68 (Brit. Milit. Ct., Wuppertal, Nov. 26th-
Dec. 3rd, 1945) [hereinafter Killinger].  
 150.  Id.  
 151.  Id.  
 152.  Id. (emphasis added).  
 153.  Id. at 67.  
 154.  See Smith, supra note 112, at 892 (noting that “[t]he experiences of World War II had 
demonstrated that coercion was not a self-defining term. The activities engaged in within several 
interrogation camps made it necessary to limit interrogation discretion. By forbidding any other 
form of coercion, [Geneva III] made clear that physical and mental torture do not exhaust the 
possibilities; indeed, any form would also be prohibited.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
 155.  Id. 
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as to this objective. 
During World War II, parties to the conflict engaged in brutal 
treatment of POWs.156 POWs were regularly sent to covert 
interrogation camps placed outside the influence of the ICRC.157 There, 
POWs were often beaten and brutalized for information.158 To acquire 
military information at one POW camp, Nazi interrogators “kicked 
[POWs], pulled their nails out, drowned them, hanged them from 
beams by their legs[,] and hammered nails into their elbows, knees and 
hip joints.”159 One scholar offered this sober assessment of the standard 
interrogation methods used: 
Before an interrogation began, the suspect was routinely roughed up for the shock 
value. The effect of this arbitrary viciousness was to daze, humiliate, and throw 
prisoners off balance at the outset in the contest of wills with their inquisitors. . . . 
Once begun, the process was nearly irreversible. If the prisoner had nothing to say 
under mild torture, the screws were progressively tightened. He might be dead or 
dying before his tormentors could bring themselves to accept that he did indeed 
know nothing.160 
The Geneva III framers believed that widespread violation of the 
1929 Convention was made easy by imprecise formulations and thus 
sought to make their 1949 version more precise.161 The attempt to 
create a precise formulation is evident in the elaboration of the term 
“coercion” in Article 17.162 The elaboration was primarily motivated by 
the fact that “coercion” is not a self-defining term and the resulting 
ambiguity lent interrogators significant discretion.163 The framers thus 
 
 156.  See Stuart Dowell, A Hell ‘Worse Than Auschwitz’ Where Thousands Were Tortured and 
Slain is Turned Into a Memorial Site, THEFIRSTNEWS (June 7, 2019), 
https://www.thefirstnews.com/article/a-hell-worse-than-auschwitz-where-thousands-were-
tortured-and-slain-is-turned-into-memorial-site-6250 (reciting various acts of violence inflicted 
on POWs during World War II). 
 157.  1960 Commentary, supra note 27, at 163.  
 158.  Id. 
 159.  Dowell, supra note 156.  
 160.  Steven M. Kleinman, The Promise of Interrogation v. the Problem of Torture, 43 VAL. 
U. L. REV. 1577, 1584 (2009) (quoting Joseph E. Persico, PIERCING THE REICH: THE 
PENETRATION OF NAZI GERMANY BY AMERICAN SECRET AGENTS DURING WORLD WAR II at 
81 (The Viking Press 1979)). 
 161.  The preliminary Commission first set up by the ICRC to assess revisions to the 1929 
Convention following World War II states this: “As to the principles which should govern any 
such revision, several different opinions were expressed. Certain delegations stressed that the 
provisions of any future Convention should be more detailed and precise, experience having 
shown that vagueness in the wording led to most varied and sometimes arbitrary interpretations.” 
Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, REPORT on the Work of the Preliminary Conference of National 
Red Cross Societies for the Study of the Conventions and of Various Problems Relative to the Red 
Cross at 69 (Geneva, July 26-Aug. 3, 1946), 
https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/RC_report-1946.pdf.  
 162.  Smith, supra note 112, at 892.  
 163.  Id. 
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recommended changing “pressure” to “moral or physical torture” as 
well as “any other form of coercion” to make clear the “prohibition of 
maltreatment of any kind whatsoever.”164 Notably, the term 
“maltreatment” is very similar to the term ill-treatment used in the 
Killinger case.165 Both indicate that the detaining party is prohibited 
from inflicting abuse on POWs. According to the Oxford Universal 
Dictionary, “maltreat” means “to abuse, ill-use; to handle roughly or 
rudely.”166 Webster’s Dictionary similarly defines “maltreat” as “to treat 
ill; treat roughly; abuse, mistreat.”167 Thus, the overarching aim of the 
drafters was to clearly eliminate abusive interrogation practices. 
Moreover, other scholars who have examined the drafting history 
of Article 17 agree that its purpose was to respond to the widespread 
cruel treatment perpetuated against POWs. The more specific 
formulation of Article 17 was designed to “eliminate[] tortious 
questioning,”168 respond to “the increased brutality of interrogation 
techniques developed in World War II,”169 and to “limit interrogation 
discretion” to prevent the rampant abuse seen in war camps.170 The 1960 
ICRC Commentary notes that the drafters “were not content to 
confirm the 1929 text,” and instead made it “more categorical” in 
response to the “great hardship” inflicted on captured POWs and the 
“flagrant violations” of Article 5 during World War II.171 The 
overwhelming evidence suggests that Article 17, then, clearly meant to 
proscribe mentally and physically damaging interrogation practices. 
This conclusion confirms that coercion requires the harmful 






 164.  Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Report on the Work of the Conference of Government 
Experts for the Study of the Conventions for the Protection of War Victims at 123 (Geneva, April 
14-26, 1947), https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/RC_report-1947.pdf.  
 165.  Killinger, supra note 149, at 68.  
 166.  Maltreatment, THE OXFORD UNIVERSAL DICTIONARY ON HISTORICAL PRINCIPLES 
(1972). 
 167.  Maltreat, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH 
(1961). 
 168.  Neil McDonald & Scott Sullivan, Rational Interpretation in Irrational Times: The Third 
Geneva Convention and the “War on Terror”, 44 HARV. INT’L L.J. 301, 308 (2003).  
 169.  Wehrum Jr., supra note 140, at 141 n.38 (quoting Smith, supra note 112, at 891–92).  
 170.  Smith, supra note 112, at 892. 
 171.  1960 Commentary, supra note 27, at 163.  
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IV. APPLYING ARTICLE 17 TO MIND-READING TECHNOLOGY: NO 
PAIN, NO PROBLEM 
Given that the literal act of reading someone’s mind is painless and 
noninvasive 172 and assuming reading someone’s mind does not cause 
mental suffering,173 mind-reading does not constitute coercion and 
therefore does not violate Article 17. Yet, the acts taken to induce a 
noncompliant detainee’s cooperation may violate the harm element. 
The legality of the use of mind-reading technology, therefore, is 
probably instrument-dependent and varies based on both the level of 
cooperation required and the acts needed to ensure compliance. 
A. Evaluation of Current Mind-Reading Instruments 
EEG-based memory detection and real-time thought extraction 
would not violate Article 17 because EEGs require a minimal amount 
of cooperation.174 First, an EEG does not require a noncooperative 
detainee to be immobilized. An EEG can record data even while the 
subject is moving, so the detainee does not have to be restrained. 
Second, an EEG permits data collection in a perfectly normal 
interrogation environment. An interrogator can simply place an EEG 
cap on a detainee’s head and conduct a routine interrogation. Because 
an EEG is neither physically invasive nor painful, the use of an EEG-
based mind-reading device on a noncooperative POW would not 
violate Article 17. 
When an fMRI is used to extract cognitive information, however, 
the question of legality is much closer though still a ‘yes’ under Article 
17.175 It is true that a noncooperative subject must be immobilized while 
undergoing an fMRI, as even slight head movements during the 
scanning process can compromise the quality of the scans. Moreover, 
interrogators have to forcibly place the subject onto the table that slides 
into the fMRI scanner. And an fMRI does not permit scanning in 
normal interrogational environments, as the noncooperative detainee 
must be slid into the scanner. Thus, it is not all that unlikely that a 
claustrophobic detainee might experience mental suffering while in the 
fMRI machine and that this could rise to the level of coercion. While 
this Note establishes harm as an element of coercion, it does not seek 
to establish the threshold of harm that gives rise to liability under 
 
 172.  See discussion supra Part II.  
 173.  See discussion supra note 28.  
 174.  See discussion supra notes 62-69.  
 175.  See discussion supra notes 42-45. 
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Article 17. Answering that question is critical to a determination about 
the legality of fMRI-based mind-reading, but is beyond the scope of 
this Note. 
B. Mind-Reading is Not Coercive Even if It Facilitates More Coercion 
Even if the application of mind-reading technology is painless, one 
scholar, Jonathan Marks, believes mind-reading technology may 
actually exacerbate instances of coercion and torture.176 Marks 
contends that because current mind-reading devices only indicate 
whether a detainee is lying or has knowledge about a valuable topic, a 
mind-reading device will merely act as a screener that will then 
facilitate “more aggressive interrogation” to elicit more specific 
information.177 If mind-reading technology facilitates greater inflictions 
of harm on detainees, such technology may violate Article 17. 
Marks’ line of reasoning is unavailing, however, for multiple 
reasons. First, his argument rests on the faulty assumption that critical 
information cannot be gleaned solely from a mind-reading device. 
Through a series of questions, a lie-detector, however, can obtain 
valuable information, such as the enemy’s susceptibility and capacity to 
attack, and whether the enemy is planning an attack. Thus, mind-
reading devices can acquire critical information without the need for 
additional interrogation. 
Second, even if mind-reading technology facilitates further 
interrogation, it is doubtful that it will make the detaining power more 
or less likely to violate Article 17. Marks’s argument rests on the 
assumption that a detaining party will coerce or torture detainees who 
it suspects have valuable information. Yet, there are many reasons why 
a detaining power may suspect a detainee is withholding information, 
such as the detainee’s rank, demeanor, or the circumstances 
surrounding their capture. Detaining parties are frequently faced with 
uncooperative detainees who they suspect have valuable information, 
and yet still choose to lawfully interrogate them without resorting to 
unlawful methods. 
Third, even assuming that a detaining power was more likely to 
aggressively interrogate a detainee, Marks does not take into account 
that mind-reading devices would screen out detainees with no valuable 
 
 176.  Jonathan H. Marks, Interrogational Neuroimaging in Counterterrorism: A No-Brainer or 
a Human Rights Hazard, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 483, 495 (2007). 
 177.  Id. at 499.  
ZARRILLI_FINAL_NOTE_12.20.21 (DO NOT DELETE) 12/22/2021  12:03 PM 
30 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [VOL. 17 
information and may reduce total instances of coercive interrogation. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Insistence that Article 17 prohibits the use of mind-reading devices 
ultimately ignores both the text and spirit behind Geneva III, and 
renders its protections counterproductive. Prohibitions on mental and 
physical abuse contained in Article 17 of Geneva III should be strictly 
followed. The use of mind-reading technology, however, is completely 
painless and is therefore not proscribed by Article 17. Moreover, an 
interpretation of Geneva III that would forbid mind-reading on POWs 
fails to deal with captors’ overwhelming incentives to use the 
technology. If any blanket prohibition on the use of mind-reading 
technology would assuredly be broken, captors who have already 
violated Article 17 would also disregard other limits on interrogation. 
Thus, allowing some mind-reading will also increase compliance with 
Article 17 and validate the spirit and goals of the framers of Geneva 
III. Instead of determining whether mind-reading is legally permissible 
altogether, the focus must be on resolving which kind of mind-reading 
instruments are permissible under Article 17. 
 
